The highest priority for any new approach to defense is to broaden the definition of security to include all threats to human life, whether they stem from terrorism, disease, environmental degradation, natural disasters or entrenched poverty. This concept of security as protection makes it clearer that the military is only one of many tools that can be used to address urgent threats. Strength should not be equated with more military dollars but with the application of the right tools to the right problems.

An example of this approach is the Unified Security Budget (USB), the product of a task force of nongovernmental policy analysts that includes officials who have served in the Pentagon, Congress and the uniformed military. Its most recent report proposes a "security shift" that would cut $62 billion from military programs and invest $52 billion in nonmilitary security tools. Proposed military cuts include cold war-era systems like the F-22 fighter plane, excessive nuclear forces and the costly, unworkable missile defense program. Alternative security proposals by the USB task force include beefed-up spending on the State Department's diplomatic capabilities and on alternative energy sources, economic development in the global South and a more sensible approach to defending US territory that includes chemical plant protection, port security and increased investment in public health.

There are a number of critical security issues that go beyond changing budget priorities. For example, efforts to "get tough" with Iran and North Korea over their pursuit or development of nuclear weapons need to be replaced by genuine negotiations. In Iran this could mean allowing a small civilian nuclear program under a strict regime of international inspections and monitoring. In North Korea the United States should take the lead in offering energy assistance, financial aid and a nonaggression pact in exchange for a rollback of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and the elimination of its current weapons. Opening trade with North Korea could help to open up the country economically and politically. Under these circumstances, this could eventually lead to reunification with the South, eliminating the threat altogether.

As for Iraq, US military withdrawal within a definite time frame (a year at most) is more likely to reduce internal violence there than the Bush Administration's "stay the course" policy. Withdrawal should be accompanied by a new infusion of economic aid--and a policy toward Iraq's oil resources that restores control to the Iraqi government. This economic program should be paralleled by an effort to negotiate conflicts among Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish factions within Iraq. Negotiations should be backed by a multiparty coalition that includes Iraq's neighbors--from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to Iran and Syria, to Turkey and Kuwait--plus major powers like the United States, Russia, China and the European Union. To avoid the gridlock that might ensue from working with such a large group, a smaller contact group should be chosen to do the direct negotiating with Iraqi factions.

Merely focusing on Iran and North Korea is not enough; drastic reductions in global nuclear arsenals should be pursued as well. Ultimately, the only reliable defense against nuclear weapons is to get rid of them. This means accelerating reductions in the nuclear holdings of the United States and Russia, which still number in the tens of thousands if one counts weapons being held in reserve. This step should be accompanied by a speeded-up process of reducing loose nukes and bomb-making materials in Russia, so that this vital task can be accomplished in four years rather than the thirteen or more it will take at current funding levels. This could be done with an additional annual investment equivalent to the cost of about one month of the occupation in Iraq.

The depoliticizing of the gathering and use of intelligence should also be a top priority. Hyped intelligence was used to sell the war in Iraq, and there are already signs that it is forming the core of a case for military action against Iran. In addition to making the details of intelligence assessments public, the CIA and its fellow intelligence agencies should be taken out of the business of covert operations, secret detentions in so-called black sites, torture, secret eavesdropping on domestic targets and other illegal activities. The gathering of intelligence should be the CIA's only job. Greater respect for the information gathered by international agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency--the only agency that was right in its assessment of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities--would also be a huge step forward.

In addition to broadening our definition of what constitutes security, we must begin a national discussion on what the mission of our armed forces should be. When should the United States use military force? Only to attack specific terrorist strongholds, to act against nations that are poised to attack the United States or one of its closest allies, to prevent genocide or to assist in policing peace agreements in unstable regions. The Bush Administration's doctrine of preventive war--which does not mean acting against an imminent threat but rather promoting a first-strike war against a country that poses a distant potential danger to US security--should be abandoned. The United States should seek United Nations and Congressional approval for acts of war and reach out to allies in a genuine fashion, not in the "take it or leave it" manner favored by the Bush Administration. Without a thorough debate over how and when to use force, efforts to change US military spending and strategy will be doomed to failure.

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